We prove that adding upwards closed first-order dependency atoms to first-order logic with team semantics does not increase its expressive power (with respect to sentences), and that the same remains true if we also add constancy atoms. As a consequence, the negations of functional dependence, conditional independence, inclusion and exclusion atoms can all be added to first-order logic without increasing its expressive power.
Introduction
Team semantics is a generalization of Tarski's semantics in which formulas are satisfied or not satisfied by sets of assignments, called teams, rather than by single assignments. It was originally developed by Hodges, in [14] , as a compositional alternative to the imperfect-information game theoretic semantics for independence friendly logic [13, 18] .
Over the past few years team semantics has been used to specify and study many other extensions of first-order logic. In particular, since a team describes a relation between the elements of its model team semantics offers a natural way to add to first-order logic atoms corresponding to database-theoretic dependency notions.
This line of thought led first to the development of dependence logic [19] , and later to that of independence logic [12] and inclusion and exclusion logics [8] . 1 By now there are many results in the literature concerning the properties of these logics, and in Section 2 we recall some of the principal ones.
One common characteristic of all these logics is that they are much stronger than first-order logic proper, even though they merely add first-order definable dependency conditions to its language. Indeed, the rules of team semantics straddle the line between first and second order, since they evaluate first-order connectives by means of second-order machinery: and, while in the case of first-order logic formulas team semantics can be reduced to Tarski's semantics, if we add to our language atoms corresponding to further conditions the second-order nature of team semantics can take over.
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the boundary between first and second order "from below", so to say, taking first-order logic with team semantics and trying to find out how much we can add to it while preserving first-orderness. In Section 3 we define a fairly general family of classes of first-order definable dependency conditions and prove they can be safely added to first-order logic; then in Section 4 we expand this family, and in Section 5 we show that, as a consequence, the negations of all the main dependency atoms studied in team semantics do not "blow up" first-order logic into a higher order one. Finally, in Section 6 we introduce a notion of boundedness for dependencies and use it to demonstrate some non-definability results.
Preliminaries
In this section we will recall some fundamental definitions and results concerning team semantics.
Definition 1 (Team)
Let M be a first-order model and let Dom(M) be the set of its elements. 2 Furthermore, let V be a finite set of variables. Then a team X over M with domain Dom(X ) = V is a set of assignments s from V to Dom(M).
Given a team X and a tuple of variables v contained in the domain of X , we write X ↾ v for the team obtained by restricting all assignments of X to the variables of v and X ( v) for the relation {s(
As it is common when working with team semantics, we will assume that all our expressions are in negation normal form. 
With respect to first-order formulas, team semantics can be reduced to Tarski's semantics. Indeed, Therefore, not all first-order definable properties of relations correspond to the satisfaction conditions of first-order formulas: for example, the non-emptiness of a relation R is definable by ∃ xR x, but there is no first order φ such that M |= X φ if and only if X = / 0. More in general, let φ * (R) be a first-order sentence specifying a property of the k-ary relation R and let x = x 1 . . . x k be a tuple of new variables: then, as it follows easily from the above proposition, there exists a first-order formula φ ( x) such that
if and only if φ * (R) can be put in the form ∀ x(R x → θ ( x)) for some θ in which R does not occur. 5 It is hence possible to extend first-order logic (with team semantics) by introducing new atoms corresponding to further properties of relations. Database theory is a most natural choice as a source for such properties; and, in the rest of this section, we will recall the fundamental database-theoretic extensions of first-order logic with team semantics and some of their properties.
Dependence logic FO(=(·, ·)), from [19] , adds to first-order logic functional dependence atoms =( x, y) based on database-theoretic functional dependencies ( [2] ). Their rule in team semantics is
This atom, and dependence logic as a whole, is downwards closed: for all dependence logic formulas φ , models M and teams Constancy logic FO(=(·)) is the fragment of dependence logic which only allows functional dependence atoms of the form =( / 0, x), which we will abbreviate as =( x) and call constancy atoms. Clearly we have that
As proved in [8] , every constancy logic sentence is equivalent to some first-order sentence: therefore, constancy logic is strictly weaker than dependence logic. Nonetheless, constancy logic is more expressive than first-order logic with respect to the second-order relations generated by the satisfaction conditions of formulas: indeed, it is an easy consequence of Proposition 4 that no first-order formula is logically equivalent to the constancy atom =(x).
Exclusion logic FO(|), from [8] , adds to first-order logic exclusion atoms x | y, where x and y are tuples of variables of the same length. Just as functional dependence atoms correspond to functional database-theoretic dependencies, exclusion atoms correspond to exclusion dependencies [3] ; and their satisfaction rule is
As proved in [8] , exclusion logic is entirely equivalent to dependence logic: every exclusion logic formula is logically equivalent to some dependence logic formula, and vice versa. Inclusion logic FO(⊆), also from [8] , adds instead to first-order logic inclusion atoms x ⊆ y based on database-theoretic inclusion dependencies [6] . The corresponding rule is
Inclusion logic is stronger than first-order logic, but weaker than existential second-order logic: indeed, as shown in [9] , sentence-wise it is equivalent to positive greatest fixed point logic GFP + . Formula-wise, it is incomparable with constancy, dependence or exclusion logic, since its formulas are union closed but not downwards closed.
Independence logic FO(⊥), from [12] , adds to first-order logic independence atoms x ⊥ y with the intended meaning of "the values of x and y are informationally independent". More formally,
This notion of informational independence has a long history: see for example [11] for an analysis of this concept from a probabilistic perspective.
The conditional independence atoms x ⊥ z y, also from [12] , relativize the independence of x and y to all fixed value of z. Their semantics is
TS-c-ind: M |= X x ⊥ z y if and only if for all tuples
As pointed out in [4] , the rule for x ⊥ z y corresponds precisely to the database-theoretic embedded multivalued dependency [5] ( z ։ x| y).
In [12] it was shown that every dependence logic formula is equivalent to some FO(⊥ c ) (conditional independence logic) formula, but not vice versa; and sentence-wise, both of these logics are equivalent to each other (and to ESO). Furthermore, in [8] it was proved that FO(⊥ c ) is equivalent to inclusion/exclusion logic 6 FO(⊆, |), even with respect to open formulas, and that this is, roughly speaking, the most general logic obtainable by adding first-order (or even existential second-order) definable dependency conditions to first-order logic. 7 More recently, in [10] , it was shown that FO(⊥) and FO(⊥ c ) are also equivalent.
We conclude this section with Figure 1 , which depicts the relations between the logics we discussed so far.
Upwards Closed Dependencies
In this work we will study the properties of the logics obtained by adding families of dependency conditions to the language of first-order logic. But what is a dependency condition, in a general sense? The following definition is based on the generalized atoms of [17] : 
Definition 6 Let n ∈ N. A dependency of arity n is a class D, closed under isomorphisms, of models over the signature {R} where R is a n-ary relation symbol. If x is a tuple of n variables (possibly with repetitions), M is a first-order model and X is a team over it whose domain contains all variables of x then
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TS-D: M |= X D x if and only if
(Dom(M), X ( x)) ∈ D. Definition 7 Let D = {D 1 , D 2 , . . .
} be a family of dependencies. Then we write FO(D) for the logic obtained by adding to the language of first-order logic all dependency atoms D x, where D ∈ D and x is a tuple of variables of the arity of D.
It is not difficult to represent the logics of Section 2 in this notation. For example, dependence logic is
The following property can be easily verified, by induction on the formulas φ : 8
Theorem 8 (Locality) Let D be a family of dependencies and let φ ( x) be a formula of FO(D) with free variables in x. Then for all models M and all teams X over it whose domain contains x, M |= X φ ( x) if and only if M |= X↾ x φ ( x).
In this work, we will be mainly interested in dependencies which correspond to first-order definable properties of relations:
Definition 9 A dependency notion D is first-order definable if there exists a first-order sentence D * (R) over the signature {R}, where R is a new relation symbol, such that
It is not necessarily the case that if D is first-order definable then FO(D) and FO are equivalent with respect to sentences. For example =(n, m)
, where x has length n and y, z have length m; but as we said in Section 2, dependence logic is stronger than first-order logic.
When is then the case that dependency conditions can be added safely to first-order logic, without increasing the expressive power? The following definition will provide us a partial answer: All the above examples except infinity and κ-bigness are first-order definable. The NE atom is the adaptation to first-order team semantics of the non-emptiness atom introduced in [20] for the propositional version of dependence logic, and the totality atom All is due to Abramsky and Väänänen ([1] 
Proof:
The proof is by structural induction on φ . . Now X = X 1 ∪ X 2 for two X 1 , X 2 such that M |= X 1 φ 1 and M |= X 2 φ 2 , and therefore by Lemma 13 M |= 
Definition 15 If θ is a first-order formula and φ is a FO(D) formula we define
where ¬θ is a shorthand for the first-order formula in negation normal form which is equivalent to the negation of θ .
The following lemma is obvious:

Lemma 16 For all first order θ and φ ∈ FO(D), M |= X (φ ↾ θ ) if and only if M |=
One can observe that (φ ↾ θ ) is logically equivalent to θ ֒→ φ , where ֒→ is the maximal implication of [16] :
We use the notation (φ ↾ θ ), instead of θ ֒→ φ , to make it explicit that θ is first order and that Lemma 16 holds. The next step of our proof of Theorem 11 is to identify a fragment of our language whose satisfaction conditions do not involve quantification over second-order objects such as teams or functions. We do so by limiting the availability of disjunction and existential quantification: As the next proposition shows, clean formulas correspond to first-order definable properties of relations.
Proposition 18 Let D be a class of first-order definable dependencies and let φ ( x) ∈ FO(D) be a clean formula with free variables in x. Then there exists some first-order sentence φ * (R), where R is a new
| x|-ary relation, such that M |= X φ ( x) ⇔ M, X ( x) |= φ * (R).(1)
Proof:
By induction over φ . All that is now left to prove is the following:
Proposition 19 Let D be a family of upwards closed dependencies. Then every FO(D) formula is equivalent to some clean FO(D) formula.
•
is nonempty for all s ∈ X , and by construction
Applying inductively these two results to all subformulas of some φ ∈ FO(D) we can obtain some clean φ ′ to which φ is equivalent, and this concludes the proof.
Finally, the proof of Theorem 11 follows at once from Propositions 18 and 19.
Since, as we saw, the negations of functional and exclusion dependencies are upwards closed, we obtain at once the following corollary:
Corollary 20 Any sentence of FO( =(·, ·), ∤) (that is, of first-order logic plus negated functional and exclusion dependencies) is equivalent to some first-order sentence.
Adding Constancy Atoms
As we saw in the previous section, upwards closed dependencies can be added to first-order logic without increasing its expressive power (with respect to sentences); and as mentioned in Section 2, this is also true for the (non upwards-closed) constancy dependencies =( x).
But what if our logic contains both upwards closed and constancy dependencies? As we will now see, the conclusion of Theorem 11 remains valid: 
In particular, every sentence of FO(D) is equivalent to some first-order sentence.
The main ingredient of our proof will be the following lemma. The proof of this lemma is by induction on φ , and it is entirely analogous to the corresponding proof from [8] . Now we can prove Theorem 21. 
Lemma 22
Proof: 
It is now easy to see that the negations of inclusion and conditional independence are in FO(=(·), =(·)):
Proposition 25
For all x, y with | x| = | y|, x ⊆ y is logically equivalent to 
Proposition 26 For all x, y and z, x ⊥ z y is logically equivalent to
∃ p q r(=( p q r) ∧ ♦( p r = x z) ∧ ♦( q r = y z) ∧ p q r = x y z).
Bounded Dependencies and Totality
Now that we know something about upwards closed dependencies, it would be useful to classify them in different categories and prove non-definability results between the corresponding extensions of first-order logic. As a first such classification, we introduce the following property:
We say that D is bounded if it is κ-bounded for some κ. 11 For example, non-emptiness and intersection are 1-bounded; inconstancy and the negations of functional dependence and exclusion are 2-bounded; and for all finite or infinite κ, κ-bigness is κ-bounded. However, totality is not bounded at all. Indeed, for any κ consider a model M of cardinality greater than κ and take the team
As we will now see, the property of boundedness is preserved by the connectives of our language. 
Conclusions and Further Work
In this work we discovered a surprising asymmetry between downwards closed and upwards closed firstorder definable dependency conditions: whereas, as it was known since [19] , the former can bring the expressive power of a logic with team semantics beyond the first order, the latter cannot do so by their own or even together with constancy atoms. As a consequence, the negations of the principal dependency notions studied so far in team semantics can all be added to first-order logic without increasing its expressive power. Our original question was: how much can we get away with adding to the team semantics of firstorder logic before ending up in a higher order logic? The answer, it is now apparent, is quite a lot. This demonstrates that team semantics is useful not only (as it has been employed so far) as a formalism for the study of very expressive extensions of first-order logic, but also as one for that of more treatable ones.
Much of course remains to be done. The notion of boundedness of Section 6 allowed us to find some non-definability results between our extensions; but the classification of these extensions is far from complete. In particular, it would be interesting to find necessary and sufficient conditions for FO(D) to be equivalent to FO over sentences. The complexity-theoretic properties of these logics, or of fragments thereof, also deserve further investigation.
Another open issue concerns the development of sound and complete proof systems for our logics. Of course, one can check whether a theory T implies a formula φ simply by using Theorems 11 and 21 to translate everything in first-order logic and then use one of the many well-understood proof systems for it; but nonetheless, it could be very informative to find out directly which logical laws our formalisms obey.
